Tuesday, November 23, 2010

What's Going on in Korea?

What is going on with the two Koreas?

Events leading up to today

There are many events that go on, including abductions of S. Koreans and others, as well as frequent near-skirmishes between the militaries of North and South Korea. Here are a few selected, and hopefully relevant, issues that have come up recently:

Since the 90s, at least, N. Korea has been working on a variety of nuclear weapons programs. All attempts by the US and others to stifle (or even identify) all such programs seem to have failed.

From about 1998-2008, S. Korea pursued what is called the “Sunshine Policy.” This was a policy of accommodation and rapprochement with N. Korea. It seemed, at times, to be succeeding, when economic or social ties between the two countries improved.

Before, during, and after the Iraq War, the US reduced the number of troops in S. Korea by about half. Removing troops from the border area is often considered an aggressive move, because the troops are within range of N. Korean artillery. It was generally believed that if the US were to seriously attack N. Korea, the first thing it would do is remove troops from that area before commencing massive bombing of the North. The Iraq War provided a good excuse to remove troops because they were needed in the Middle East.

North Korea appears to have tested a crude nuclear device in 2006. It is unclear to what extent they had integrated such capability with a delivery mechanism (such as a missile).

In 2009, N. Korea again tested a nuclear device underground, as well as several missiles. It is still unclear to what extent they have been able to weaponize a nuclear device.

In March, a S. Korean warship was sunk by an explosion, killing 46. Several reports later concluded that the explosion was caused by a N. Korean torpedo.

In late September, Kim Jong Un, son of Kim Jong Il, was designated as the next leader of the country. Some felt there was internal dissent or tension at this time, possibly between factions within the military.

Last week, N. Korea revealed a previously undisclosed uranium-enriching operation. The equipment was modern and recently constructed.

In general, winter is a hard time in N. Korea. The economy there struggles to produce enough food, energy, or medical care to take care of its people. Frequently, especially in the winter, the North is dependent on food, heating oil, and medicine aid from the US, Japan, Europe, China, and S. Korea. In recent years, deals for such aid were often struck at the “Six Party Negotiations” between China, the US, Russia, N. Korea, S. Korea, and Japan.

No serious reaction from S. Korea or the US over the torpedo attack or the uranium enrichment has been made public (and probably, nothing had yet really occurred). The Six Party Talks are not currently underway and the US has made cessation of nuclear activities a precursor to resuming them. N. Korea has requested direct, bi-lateral negotiations with the US, which the US has refused.

Here is a more thorough timeline: http://www.nytimes.com/info/north-korea/news/.

Today’s events

The events that unfolded today actually started a couple of days ago. South Korea regularly does large-scale military exercises near North Korean waters. Some territorial waters are disputed. S. Korea generally has the better, if not airtight, claims to these waters in the eyes of the international community. Although invited to participate, the US was not involved in the recent exercises. The North asked South Korea not to use live ammunition in the exercises, but the South did, anyway. The South was generally firing away from N. Korea (from north to south). A few days ago, N. Korea seems to have requested that the exercises not occur (or perhaps again that they not use live ammunition). The South seems to have ignored this request. In fact, the South continued the exercise and fired some shots into a region of ocean to which N. Korea disputes S. Korea’s claim. There were no N. Korean targets there, just disputed water.

Today, N. Korean artillery began shelling an island near N. Korean waters. The island has both civilian and military structures and people on it. Two S. Korean marines were killed and some civilians and soldiers were injured. South Korea returned artillery fire and launched aircraft which apparently struck targets in N. Korea. Information about the extent of the damage or casualties in N. Korea doesn’t seem to be available. After an hour or two, both sides stopped firing and S. Korea began evacuating people and putting out fires on the island. Their military remains at the highest alert.

Why did they do it?

The first interesting question is what motivated this attack, which was a clear escalation. Complaining about somebody else doing live-fire exercises and shooting at civilians’ houses are obviously very different “levels.” It is almost impossible to understand the motivations of the N. Korean regime, which don’t always seem consistent, let alone understandable, predictable, or rational. I believe there are several possibilities for explaining N. Korea’s blatant escalation today:

1) The North believed a return to the Six Party Talks was imminent, perhaps over the uranium revelation, and is trying to gain some kind of advantage in the negotiation. If you create a problem, you can offer “stopping the problem” as a concession in negotiations. I don’t know that this strategy would work, but the North seems to have used it before.

2) They are trying to force a return to the Six Party Talks before the cold of winter deepens, perhaps because they believed that the West was going to “let them starve” this winter. Perhaps, behind the scenes, the US was already threatening N. Korea with something and this is their way of “changing the equation.”

3) The new leader is being given some sort of opportunity to ingratiate himself with the military or prove himself to the military.

4) Because of the weak response or lack of response to the torpedo incident and the uranium facility revelation, perhaps the North is overconfident. Perhaps they believe the US and S. Korea don’t have the will to respond and the N. Koreans are simply pushing the envelope.

5) There is internal division in the North, and an aggressive or militant faction is testing its ability to act independently from the leadership.

6) There is a lack of command and control in the North, and soldiers accidentally escalated a situation without the permission of the leadership.

What must S. Korea and the US consider in response?

It is very difficult for the US or S. Korea to respond. There are several considerations:

1) The US cannot allow provocations like this to go unanswered, because it seriously undermines alliance with S. Korea and Japan and casts doubt upon America’s ability to defend its allies. It risks emboldening China to use (or continue to use) N. Korea as a proxy bully to influence S. Korea and Japan while diffusing blame away from itself.

2) Any military response risks further escalation. Tens of millions of S. Koreans are within range of N. Korean weapons on the border. N. Korea has a huge, standing army.

3) China has not been willing to enforce any serious sanctions on N. Korea.

4) Everyone seems worried about internal stability in N. Korea, and whether there is some sort of struggle going on there, as well as what would happen were the leadership to fail or be removed.

5) N. Korea may have a nuclear device that can be “fired” or “launched.” No one is quite sure. It is unclear whether the US knows where such devices are and could pre-emptively destroy them. Given that we can’t find the enrichment facilities, it seems unlikely we could pre-empt such a launch. Such a device could probably only reach S. Korea, but possibly Japan.

Andy’s recommendation:

There must be a serious response and it must take China into account. We must break the pattern of letting N. Korea provoke the world, then negotiating, then giving away carrots in negotiations. That pattern encourages continued aggression. We must also somehow punish N. Korea without escalating the military situation if possible, and without causing an all-out war.

In many ways, the ideal response would be a total blockade of the North. This would again re-balance the negotiating positions. In eventual negotiations, the US would then be offering simply to stop blockading the North, rather than offering it incentives to stop attack S. Korea. However, the North has previously claimed they would consider this an act of war (they have to say that, for obvious reasons), and China has never honored such a blockade. China is the biggest trading partner for the North. Even if such a blockade were to succeed, millions of N. Koreans could die from cold and starvation.

Therefore, I believe the US should pursue a multi-pronged strategy:

1) The US should declare a partial blockade of N. Korea and should move an aircraft carrier East of of Japan. It should pledge to board and search all ships entering N. Korea under the non-proliferation initiative framework to check all cargo for contraband. It should reserve the right to refuse passage to any or all ships into N. Korean waters as well as to seize any cargo meant for N. Korea. It should not necessarily enforce this blockade, but should set up the infrastructure to do so. All aid shipments should be suspended.

2) The US should signal consideration of committing an additional $1 trillion to missile defense programs over the next 20 years. It should signal that these missile defense systems would be designed to protect Taiwan, Japan, and S. Korea, and that such systems would be designed to “destroy all missiles launched from the region, including all nuclear missiles.” It should indicate that such programs could still be cancelled.

3) The US should immediately propose to sell the Aegis weapon system to the navies of S. Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to “promote regional safety and stability.”

4) The US should immediately request that India be added to the UN Security Council.

5) The US should also immediately pledge $10M (a token amount) to promoting “democracy and freedom of information in Asia.”

6) S. Korea should immediately pledge “support to Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and other American, Japanese, and S. Korean internet companies” to provide a haven for search engines, internet media, etc. in S. Korea from which to “serve Asian users.”

7) S. Korea, Japan, and the US should immediately announce new rules requiring any acquisition of any American, Japanese, or S. Korean company by any Chinese entity must be reviewed by the respective governments.

8) The US should tell China that it must publicly denounce the N. Korean attacks and announce public support for the Six Party Talks to resume.

9) The US should propose a resumption of the Six Party Talks.

10) The US should explain to China that many of these provisions can be reversed, and should agree in private with China on whether to back a coup d’etat by the military in N. Korea, should one occur.

11) The US should announce that if a “peaceful actor” were to change the regime in N. Korea, the US would recognize that entity as a new government and would lift the restrictions on N. Korea.

12) The US should move a token number of troops (perhaps 500) away from the Korean border. It should claim that they are being “redeployed” for “security reasons.” It should announce that it is contemplating further “redeployments.”

13) The US should immediately order Patriot-missile-type systems as well as other defensive weapons moved to S. Korea “sometime during 2011.”

14) The US should propose replacing SEATO with a new organization, complete with a true mutual defense pact, to include the US, UK, Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and India. It should propose placing its remaining troops in Japan and S. Korea under the command of this body, which would operate much the way NATO does. It should gain commitments totaling 40K troops and many naval assets from the other countries. It should set a timetable for building up such an organization’s capabilities by 2015. The US should further propose that a broader organization, to include Pakistan and other SEATO members, but without the mutual defense pact, also be created.

In all cases, these are measures which could be negotiated away but which would, if not negotiated away, actually be pursued. I believe these measures (or measures like these) strike the right balance between punishment and escalation, while pressuring China, but don’t give enough provocation to the North for it to escalate the military attacks.

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